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MAJOR COURT DECISIONS*
AMERICAN PUBLIC COMMUNICATIONS COUN-
Cm v. FCC 215 F.3d 51 (D.C. Cir. 2000)
Issue: Whether the Federal Communications
Commission's ("FCC") per-call compensation fee
plan for coinless "dial around" calls, which does
not include a bad debt figure or a collection cost
figure and rests on data based on marginal rather
than average payphones, ensures that all
payphone service providers ("PSPs") are fairly
compensated as required under Section 276 of
the Telecommunications Act of 1996 (the "1996
Act").
Holding: The court held that the FCC's per-call
compensation fee plan for coinless "dial around"
calls was not arbitrary or capricious, and thus did
not violate Section 276 of the 1996 Act.
Discussion: PSPs are independent payphone ser-
vice providers that compete with Local Exchange
Carriers ("LEC"), and generate their revenue
from either coin calls or contracts with inter-
exchange carriers for collect and calling card
calls. Prior to the 1996 Act, PSPs were largely un-
compensated for "dial around" coinless calls-
calls made using a long-distance carrier other
than the payphone's subscribed carrier. Section
276 of the 1996 Act requires that the FCC estab-
lish a per-call compensation plan that fairly com-
pensates all PSPs for every completed intrastate
and interstate call made using their payphone.
The court previously remanded the following
two FCC attempts to set the price for each call,
holding that the methods used in establishing
these rates represented arbitrary and capricious
decision making: 1) a market-based surrogate that
established the rate at 35 cents, and 2) an actual
marked-based rate with a starting point of 35
cents, minus 6.6 cents per call, which represented
the difference between coin and coinless calls.
However, the court upheld the FCC's third at-
tempt to set a fair compensation rate at 24 cents.
PSPs argued that the rate was too low and thus did
not fairly compensate them as required under
Section 276 of the 1996 Act. The court disagreed
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and held that the rate, as established by the FCC,
was not a result of arbitrary or capricious decision-
making. The court noted that the FCC's decision
to exclude the bad debt figure because it lacked
reliability was reasonable, particularly in this new
area of regulation. The court also found that the
FCC fairly accounted for the sales, as well as gen-
eral and administrative costs, by including joint
and common payphone overhead costs. Finally,
the court concluded that it was not unreasonable
or arbitrary for the FCC to rely upon data based
on marginal payphones, which covered costs but
were otherwise unprofitable, as opposed to aver-
age payphone costs because the data provider ex-
plained how it was developed and its shortcom-
ings.
AMERICAN CIVIL LIBERTIES UNION V. RENO
217 F.3d 162 (3d Cir. 2000)
Issue: Whether preliminary injunction is war-
ranted against enforcement of the Child Online
Protection Act ("COPA").
Holding: The court affirmed the district court's
grant of a preliminary injunction preventing en-
forcement of COPA because the ACLU's attack
on its constitutionality is likely to succeed on the
merits.
Discussion: Previously, on First Amendment
grounds, the Supreme Court struck down the
Communications Decency Act ("CDA"), the gov-
ernment's first attempt to control the dissemina-
tion of indecent material to minors via the In-
ternet. This court determined that the ACLU's
constitutional attack on COPA-the govern-
ment's next attempt to control the knowing dis-
semination of "harmful material" to minors via
the Internet for "commercial purposes," as mea-
sured by "contemporary community standards"-
is likely to succeed on its merits. Therefore, the
district court's granting of a preliminary injunc-
tion was appropriate.
First, the court agreed with the district court
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that COPA's restriction is content-based and must
be reviewed under strict scrutiny. The court then
acknowledged that the government's interest in
protecting minors from harmful material is com-
pelling, but found that COPA's "harmful mate-
rial" and "contemporary community standards"
alone would likely ensure COPA's unconstitution-
ality. The court stated that this is due to the tech-
nological inability to restrict access to the Internet
based on geographic locale and therefore the in-
ability to measure according to each community's
standards. Thus, regulating according to "contem-
porary community standards" poses an impermis-
sible burden on the First Amendment because
whether a site is harmful to minors would be mea-
sured by the most conservative community stan-
dard.
The court considered whether the statute could
be saved by a more narrow interpretation or dele-
tion of the unconstitutional portion of the statute.
However, the court determined that the "contem-
porary community standard" has historically been
a geographical standard, and there is no prof-
fered evidence suggesting otherwise. Next, the
court held that striking "contemporary commu-
nity standards" would not likely salvage COPA be-
cause it is an integral, and not independent, part
of COPA. The court then determined that if the
preliminary injunction were not issued, COPA-af-
fected web publishers' speech would be curtailed
and any loss of First Amendment freedoms consti-
tutes irreparable injury. The court then found
that the injury to web publishers subject to COPA
outweighed the harm if the preliminary injunc-
tion was not issued because web publishers would
have to censor constitutionally protected speech
and incur substantial financial costs to implement
COPA's affirmative defenses. The court summed
up its support of the district court's issuance of a
preliminary injunction by finding that constitu-
tional protection of speech is in the public inter-
est.
AT&T COMMUNICATIONS OF THE SOUTHERN
STATES, INC. V. BELLSOUTH TELECOMMUNICA-
TIONS, INC. 229 F.3d 457 (4th Cir. 2000)
Issue: Whether the district court may review a
negotiated element of an interconnection agree-
ment, and if so, whether the district court erred in
striking a provision from the interconnection
agreement.
Holding: The court held that the district court
may review negotiated elements of an intercon-
nection agreement to determine whether they are
consistent with the 1996 Act. The court remanded
the case to the district court for review following
the Supreme Court's decision to vacate FCC Rule
47 C.F.R. § 51.319 ("Rule 319"), which was the un-
derlying basis for district's court's decision to
strike the provision from the interconnection
agreement.
Discussion: This case arose following a compet-
ing local exchange carrier's ("CLEC") request for
review of an interconnection agreement with the
incumbent local exchange carrier ("ILEC"). On
review, the district court struck a paragraph from
the negotiated agreement because it found that
the paragraph was inconsistent with the 1996 Act.
Subsequently the CLEC appealed, but following
the appeal and before the oral arguments, the Su-
preme Court changed the law that supported the
district court's decision to strike the paragraph as
inconsistent with the 1996 Act. The Supreme
Court vacated Rule 319, which called for a mini-
mum number of network elements an ILEC must
make available to the requesting carrier, finding
that the FCC failed to adhere to the "necessary
and impair" standards when it mandated Rule
319. This court remanded to the district court for
reconsideration of whether to strike the provision
of the interconnection agreement. The court also
held that because the provision closely tracked
the controlling law, in this case Section 251 (c) (3),
the presumption is that it was negotiated and that
the district court may review all negotiated provi-
sions to ensure consistency with the 1996 Act.
PEAVY V. WFAA-TV, INC. 221 F.3d 158
(5th Cir. 2000)
Issue: Whether the Federal Wiretap Act ("the
Act") is vague and overbroad, and whether the
Act provides civil redress for the procurement of
unlawful interceptions of covered communica-
tion. Also, whether the Act deserves strict scrutiny
under the First Amendment.
Holding: The Act is constitutional and does not
provide for civil redress for the procurement of
unlawful interceptions of covered communica-
tion. Further, the Act deserves intermediate scru-
tiny because it is content-neutral and furthers an
important government- interest-that of prohibit-
ing unlawful interception of covered communica-
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tion-and does so by only incidentally burdening
the First Amendment.
Discussion: This case arose following a neigh-
bor's taping of a school board trustee's cordless
telephone conversations, which were transferred
to a television station and its reporter, allegedly
violating the Act and other state law claims. The
district court granted summary judgment for the
defendant television station and its reporter. The
United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Cir-
cuit affirmed in part, reversed in part, vacated in
part and remanded. The Act precludes intercep-
tion of any wire, oral or electronic communica-
tion. This court affirmed the district court's sum-
mary judgment on the civil procurement claim
because the Act is unambiguous and redresses
"use" and "disclosure," not procurement of unlaw-
ful interception of another. This court reversed
the district court's summary judgment for the tel-
evision station by finding that the Act is content-
neutral and survives intermediate scrutiny be-
cause it prohibits all unlawfully obtained informa-
tion independent of subject matter. Furthermore,
the Act poses only an incidental burden not spe-
cific to the media and advances an important gov-
ernmental interest, which is protecting the privacy
of covered communication. Finally, the court held
that the Act is not vague and overbroad, and that
there were genuine issues of material fact regard-
ing whether the television station disclosed the
contents of the unlawful interceptions and other
state law issues.
MCI TELECOMMUNICATIONS CORP. V. ILLI-
NOIS BELL TELEPHONE Co. 222 F.3d 323 (7th
Cir. 2000)
Issue: Whether private carriers -may sue state
commissions and their commissioners in federal
court for violations of Sections 251 and 252 of the
1996 Act.
Holding: Several cases were consolidated. By af-
firming, reversing and remanding the district
court's grant and denial of motions for Eleventh
Amendment immunity respectively, the court
held that the state commissions and their commis-
sioners waived their Eleventh Amendment immu-
nity by participating in the regulatory scheme cre-
ated by the 1996 Act. The court also held that the
Ex parte Young doctrine does not preclude suit
against the state's-commissioners.
Discussion: The court rested its decision on Col,
lege Savings Bank v. Florida Prepaid Postsecondary
Educ. Expense Bd., 119 S. Ct 2219 (1999), where
that Court held that constructive waivers are only
permitted when the Congress conditions a gift on
that state's waiving its Eleventh Amendment im-
munity. In particular, the court found that under
the 1996 Act, Congress invited states to regulate
interconnection agreements and other elements
of the local telephone market. A state's accept-
ance of this offer is voluntary. Congress' gift to the
state is federal regulatory power and the accept-
ance of the gift's condition, as evidenced by a
state exercising regulatory authority under the
1996 Act, constitutes a state's waiver of sovereign
immunity. The court also held that the carriers
were not barred by the Ex pane Young doctrine
from proceeding with their federal claims for
equitable relief against each commissioner. The
1996 Act does not provide for a detailed remedial
scheme, and the challenge is prospective and
ongoing because it concerns whether the state
commissioner's decisions are in line with the 1996
Act.
SOUTHWESTERN BELL CO. V. CONNECT
COMMUNICATIONS CORP. 225 F.3d 942 (8th
Cir. 2000)
Issue: Whether Section 252(e)(6) of the 1996
Act grants federal courts jurisdiction to review a
state commission's order interpreting and enforc-
ing an interconnection agreement.
Holding: The court reversed the district court
and held that Section 252(e) (6), as part of the
1996 Act, grants federal courts jurisdiction to re-
view state commission enforcement proceedings
for compliance with federal law.
Discussion: Under the 1996 Act, which seeks to
improve competition in the local telephone ser-
vice market, the state commission, or in its ab-
sence the FCC, must approve interconnection
agreements between the incumbent and the new
carrier. The state must ensure that the agreement
complies with certain requirements of the 1996
Act and enforce certain state law requirements.
Following an interconnection agreement and ap-
proval by the Arkansas Public Service Commission
(the "state Commission"), a dispute developed be-
tween Southwestern Bell and Connect over the re-
ciprocal compensation arrangement. Connect
filed a complaint and was granted declaratory re-
lief by the state Commission. Southwestern filed
2001]
COMMLAW CONSPECTUS
suit in a federal court against Connect and the
state Commission, challenging the state Commis-
sion's decision. The district court granted the
state Commission and Connects' motion to dis-
miss for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction, hold-
ing that the 1996 Act grants federal court's juris-
diction only to determine if interconnection
agreements meet federal law requirements, not to
review a state Commission's order interpreting
and enforcing an interconnection agreement.
The court of appeals reversed. The court held
that the 1996 Act applies "in any case in which a
[s]tate [C]ommission makes a 'determination'
under section 252," and "any party aggrieved by
such determination may bring an action in an ap-
propriate federal district court to determine
whether the agreement or statement meets the re-
quirements of section 251 of this title and this sec-
tion [252]."
AT&T CORP. V. CITY OF PORTLAND 216
F.3d 871 (9th Cir. 2000)
Issue: Whether a local cable franchising author-
ity may condition a transfer of a cable franchise
upon the cable operator's grant of unrestricted
access to its cable broadband transmission facili-
ties for Internet Service Providers ("ISPs") other
than the operator's proprietary service.
Holding: Because a cable service that provides
Internet service through its cable lines is acting as
a telecommunications carrier, the Communica-
tions Act preempts a local franchising authority's
condition that a franchisee grant access to its
broadband transmission facilities.
Discussion: Under the Cable Act, local franchis-
ing authorities retain the ability to regulate cable
services, but the Cable Act preempts most state
law regarding telecommunications services. The
city of Portland agreed to permit a transfer of con-
trol of the city's cable lines to AT&T on condition
that AT&T open its cable modem platform to
competing ISPs. AT&T challenged the condition
on the grounds that it violated the Cable Act, the
First Amendment, the Commerce Clause and the
Contract Clause under the Constitution. The
Ninth Circuit, reversing the district court's deci-
sion, found that a cable modem Internet service is
a telecommunications service under the Cable
Act. Therefore, Portland's condition on the trans-
fer of control violated Section 541 (b) (3) (c) of the
Cable Act, which vests the regulation of telecom-
munications carriers with the FCC, not local
franchising authorities.
MCI TELECOMMUNICATIONS CORP. V. PUB-
LIC SERVICE COMM'N OF UTAH 216 F.3d 929
(10th Cir. 2000)
Issue: Whether Utah constructively waived its
sovereign immunity when it arbitrated an inter-
connection dispute under Section 252 of the 1996
Act.
Holding: The court affirmed the district court's
denial of the defendant's motion to dismiss on
Eleventh Amendment immunity grounds, holding
that Utah constructively waived its sovereign im-
munity when it arbitrated the interconnection dis-
pute under Section 252 of the 1996 Act.
Discussion: Congress passed the 1996 Act to en-
courage local competition in the telecommunica-
tions industry. To accomplish this goal, Congress
established baseline rules for companies inter-
ested in providing communications services. Sec-
tion 251 of the 1996 Act places several duties on
an ILEC to facilitate market entry. An ILEC's pri-
mary obligation is to share its network with its
competitors. Section 252 of the 1996 Act permits
an incumbent and a new carrier to privately agree
on the terms of an interconnection agreement
and if that fails, either party under Section
252(a)(1) may petition the state Commission,
which regulates the local phone service, to arbi-
trate open issues.
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